RECENT CASES
Labor Law-Veterans' Right to Reemployment under Selective Training and
Service Act-"Super-seniority"-[Federall.-The plaintiff corporation, a manufacturing concern whose activities had greatly expanded during the war-time
emergency, but whose employees had been reduced over two-thirds since the
cessation of hostilities,' brought suit for declaratory judgment to determine the
respective rights to employment of four returning veterans and four nonveteran employees. The veterans based their claim to reemployment on the
Selective Training and Service Act,2 although each of them would displace a
non-veteran with greater seniority, while the non-veterans claimed rights under
the collective bargaining agreement in effect with the plaintiff guaranteeing
seniority rights with respect to lay-offs, reemployment, demotions, and promotions. It was admitted by the non-veterans that the veterans were entitled to
seniority accrued during military service in addition to that accrued during their
actual employment with the plaintiff. Held, three of the veterans are not entitled
to reemployment since they had held merely "temporary" positions with the
plaintiff, their employment being subsequent to the expansion begun by the
plaintiff in 1939 because of the emergency. The fourth veteran, who had been
employed prior to 1939, may not be employed to the prejudice of one with

greater seniority, thus advancing him beyond the seniority he would have
possessed had he not entered military service. In any event it would be unreasonable to require that he replace the senior employee in view of the employer's
changed circumstances. The considerations applied to the case of the fourth
veteran were also held applicable to the cases of the first three veterans.
Olin Industries, Inc. v. Barnett.3
On the face of the act 4 it would at first appear that the veterans' claim of an
"absolute right to reemployment"s or "super-seniority" 6 is sound. The condi' The plaintiff employed an average of 2,333 persons from 1935 to 1939. In1943 the plaintiff
had a maximum of 11,926 employees. Following the end of the-war this number decreased
until in September, 1945, only 4,369 employees remained. During the years from 194o to
October, 1945, 3,459 employees entered military service.
254
Stat. 89o (i94O), as amended 58 Stat. 798 (i944), 5o U.S.C.A. (Appendix) § 308 (b),
(c)(Supp., 1945).
3 3 C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv. 62,935 (D.C. Ill., 1946).
4 "8(b). In the case of any such person, who, in order to perform such training and service,
has left or leaves a position, other than a temporary position, in the employ of any employer
and who (i) receives such certificate, (2) is still qualified to perform the duties of such position,
and (3) makes application for reemployment within ninety days after he is relieved from such
training and service .....
"(B) if such position was in the employ of a private employer, such employer shall restore
such person to such position or to a position of like seniority, status, and pay unless the
employer's circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so."
Selective Training and Service Act, 54 Stat. 89o (i94o) as amended 58 Stat. 798 (i944),
So U.S.C.A. (Appendix) § 308 (b), (Supp., 1945).
sThis expression has been used in the discussions in Reemployment Rights of Veterans,
7 NAM Law Digest 17, 20 (1944), and Couper, The Reemployment Rights of Veterans, 238
Annals of the Am. Acad. 112, 117 (i945).
6Discussion of the problem in terms of "super-seniority" may be found in Silvey, Veteran
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tions on which a veteran's right to reemployment is predicated do not include
seniority; 7 seniority is used only as a measure of an alternative position, and
the subsequent provision that the veteran shall suffer no loss in seniority 8 applies to his status after restoration. The Director of Selective Service has taken
this position. 9 The Department of Labor, on the other hand, has stated that
there is no basis for an interpretation that would require displacement by a
veteran of an employee with greater seniority,o and the same conclusion has
been reached in several arbitration cases.- It is pointed out that under these
conditions a veteran's restoration to a particular job would result in an advancement in his seniority rather than his placement in a position of "lke
2
seniority.""1
Furthermore, the veteran must be considered "as having been on
furlough or leave of absence"; an employee who returns from such leave does
3
not displace an employee with greater seniority.1
In a recent case, decided in another circuit, it was held that a veteran reemployed under the Selective Training and Service Act is subject after reemployment to lay-off in the order of ordinary seniority although the act provides that he shall not be discharged without cause within one year after his
Seniority in Reemployment, Memorandum igo-A, The Union Viewpoint in Seniority in
Veteran Reemployment, Am. Man. Ass'n, no. 92 Personnel Series, 28, 32 (1945); Research
Institute of America, Rehiring Your Company's Veteran 15 (1945); Reemployment Rights of
Veterans Defined, 17 Lab. Rel. Rep. 127 (1945). The term "super-seniority" might be considered inapt since the question is actually that of removing the right from the problem of
seniority.
7 The comparable English and Canadian Acts provide specifically that the veteran's right
to reemployment is subject to seniority. Reinstatement in Civil Employment Act '944,
7 & 8 Geo. VI, c. i , § 5; Reinstatement in Civil Employment Act 1942 (Canada), 6 & 7 Geo.
VI, c. 3r, § 3.
8 "8(c). Any person who is restored to a position .... shall be considered as having been on
furlough or leave of absence during his period of training and service .... [and] shall be so
restored without loss of seniority .... " 54 Stat. 89o (x940), 5oU.S.C.A. (Appendix) § 308 (c)

(1944).
9 Selective Service Local Board Memorandum igo-A, Part IV, i(d) (May, '944); Guides to
Veterans' Reemployment Rights, i4 Lab. Rel. Rep. 379 ('944); see also Absolute Guarantee
of Veterans' Jobs, x6 Lab. Rel. Rep. 349 (1945); Selective Service System Handbook, Veterans
Assistance Program, Part III-Statutory Reemployment Rights, 2 C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv.
19,300, at pp. 20,711, 20,713. The National Association of Manufacturers has supported
this view; Reemployment Rights of Veterans, 7 NAM Law Digest 17 (1944).
"0Labor Department on Superseniority, 16 Lab. Rel. Rep. 485 (1945). Spokesmen for
labor are in accord; V. G. Reuther in Seniority and Reemployment of War Veterans, Nat.
Indust. Conf. Board, Studies in Personnel Policy No. 65; Silvey, op. cit. supra, note 6. Counsel
for the Short Line Railroad Association and the Law Committee of the Association of American Railroads agree, Superseniority as Applied to Railroads, 15 Lab. Rel. Rep. 233 (1944).
"1In re Timken Roller Bearing Co., x6 Lab. Rel. Rep. 58 (I945); In re Bell Aircraft Corp.,
17 Lab. Rel. Rep. 927 (1946); In re Scoville Mfg. Co., 21 War. Lab. Rep. 200 (1944).
"2Olin Industries, Inc., v. Barnett, 3 C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv. 62,935 at p. 68,593 (D.C.
Ill., 1946); V. G. Reuther, op. cit. supra, note io; Couper, op. cit. supra, note 5.
13 Couper, op. cit. supra, note 5, at 113.
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restoration. 4 It might seem absurd, assuming an absolute right of the veteran
to reemployment, to say that a senior non-veteran laid off or demoted by
reason of the reemployment of a veteran could immediately claim his job back
on the basis of the principle of seniority, to which the veteran is subject after
his reemployment.' s But if the supposedly displaced senior non-veteran were
not laid off at the time, the veteran would be the one laid off upon a subsequent
reduction of personnel, because of his lower seniority;z6 or if the displaced nonveteran were rehired or promoted back to his old position soon afterwards, the
veteran would again be displaced on a reduction. Thus the right to reemployment would apparently mean very little apart from the question of seniority,
7
in spite of the apparent attempt of Congress to evade the question.
The court's holding that the positions of the first three veterans were merely
"temporary' 'S offers a tempting avenue of escape from the problem of "superseniority" in many cases. By this means employees hired while the plant was
still on a peace-time footing are protected from displacement by veterans hired
after the emergency expansion of the plant, although the more difficult problem
of the older veteran who was "permanently" employed is not solved. It does not
appear, however, that there was any understanding at the time when the first
three veterans were hired that they were to be "temporary," since the holding
of the court was based solely on their hiring during the period of emergency
expansion. Thus a large class of veterans who might well have expected at the
time of hiring that they would be "permanent" (as much as any job is permanent) would be removed entirely from the protection of these provisions of
the act, which do not apply to "temporary" employees. 9 It would seem that
they should at least be permitted to assert their claims as against employees
junior in point of service.
X4Fishgold v. Sullivan Dry Dock and Repair Corp., 3 C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv.
63,014
(C.C.A. 2d, 1946). Accord, Droste v. Nash-Kelvinator Corp., 3 C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv.
62,947 (D.C. Mich., 1946). But see Whirls v. Trailmobile Co., 3 C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv.
62,929 (D.C. Ohio, i945). In agreement with the Fishgold case are opinions of arbitrators.
In re Sullivan Dry Dock and Repair Corp., 16 Lab. Rel. Rep. 583 ('945); In re Dow Chemical
Co., 17 Lab. Rel. Rep. 646 (1945).
SNote 8, supra.
" Fishgold v. Sullvan Dry Dock and Repair Corp., 3 C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv. 63,o14

(C.C.A. 2d, 1946).
'7

The seniority problem in reemployment was before Congress in its debates on the act,

see 86 Cong. Rec. ioxo8, ioio9 (194o), and the National Association of Manufacturers re-

quested a clarification of these provisions while the act was under consideration by the House
Military Affairs Committee, H. Rep. 10132, at 632, 7 6th Cong. 3 d Sess. (i94o). Nevertheless
Congress left the applicable sections in the present ambiguous condition; compare the Department of Justice's neutral stand in interpretation of the act, Dept. of Justice Circ. no.
3851, Supp. 3, May 1o, 1945, 2 C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv. I9,204, i6 Lab. Rel. Rep. 485 (i945).
"9The act applies "In the case of any ....person who ....has left .... other than a
temporary position ..... "54 Stat. 89o (Ig4o), as amended 58 Stat. 798 (1944), 5o U.S.C.A.
(Appendix) § 308 (b) (Supp., 1945).
19
Note I8, supra.
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Probably the best solution of the problem is found in the "impossible or
unreasonable" clause in the act.20 It would not be impossible to reinstate the
veteran defendants, but it would appear to be unreasonable to require their reinstatement when the employer's operations have been so reduced that senior
employees would have to be displaced. Industrial and labor practices which
have been built up over many years would be disrupted and a solution of
employment problems according to procedures which have been established in
industry would no longer be possible. A policy bound to arouse antagonism
within the plant would be substituted and the result would be harmful to both
labor and management.2' f veterans are given seniority out of proportion to
that which they would have possessed had they not gone into military service,
older workers with perhaps greater responsibilities would be deprived of a status
on which they have come to rely; among those displaced may be veterans of the
first World War.- It is conceivable that some employers might have to operate
almost entirely with relatively unskilled personnel. Those who have served their
country in the armed forces are entitled to compensating benefits, but these
should not be at the expense of a particular class.23

Taxation-Constitutionality of Community-Property Estate Tax Amendments-[United States].-The plaintiffs, sole beneficiaries under the will of a
Louisiana testator, filed a federal estate tax return reporting only one-half the
value of the community property and one-half the proceeds of insurance policies
on the decedent's life, premiums for which had been paid out of community
funds. The decedent had been the sole contributor to the community fund.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue under the authority of the 1942 community-property estate tax amendments' to the Revenue Code levied a deficiency assessment, including in the gross estate the entire value of the community property and the entire proceeds from the insurance policies. The
0 An employer must restore a qualified person to "such position or to a position of like
seniority, status, and pay unless the employer's circumstances have so changed as to make it
impossible or unreasonable to do so." 54 Stat. 89o (x94o), as amended 58 Stat. 798 ('944),
50 U.S.C.A. (Appendix) § 3o8 (b) (B) (Supp., 1945). The constitutionality of this section of
the act was upheld in Hall v. Union Light, Heat and Power Co., 53 F. Supp. 817 (Ky.,
1944). See also Kay v. General Cable Corp., x44 F. 2d 653 (C.C.A. 3 d, '944), with regard to
interpretation of this provision.
. In the instant case one of the veterans was attempting to displace his former foreman.

- The American Veterans of World War 11 have contended that this would mean robbing
Peter to pay Paul. Veterans Body's "No" to Superseniority, I5 Lab. Rel. Rep. i98, i99 ('944).
23 Olin Industries, Inc. v. Barnett, 3 C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv.
62,935 at p. 68,593 (D.C. Ill.,
1946); Droste v. Nash-Kelvinator Corp., 3 C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv. 62,947 at p. 68,631 (D.C.
Mich., 1946) (quoting General Bradiey, Administrator of Veterans' Affairs); In re Dow Chemical Co., I7 Lab. Rel. Rep. 646 (1946).
x56 Stat. 941 (1942), 26 U.S.C.A. § 8xi (e) (2) (Supp., 1945); 26 U.S.C.A. § 8ii (g) (4)
(Supp., 1945).

